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Confounding Conventional Wisdom: Political not Principled Differences in the Transatlantic 
Regulatory Relationship1 
Alasdair R. Young 
 
In 2008 two long-standing regulatory disputes between the United States and the European 
Union again hit the news.  In January 2008 the deadline for the EU’s compliance with the 
World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) ruling on its procedures for approving genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) expired with only partial compliance.  In October 2008 the 
WTO ruled that the US and Canada had not violated WTO rules by continuing to apply 
sanctions against the EU despite it having modified its ban on hormone-treated beef.  These 
WTO complaints seem to confirm two separate, but related conventional wisdoms about the 
transatlantic economic relationship: that it is highly conflictual and that many of the conflicts 
are rooted in profoundly different approaches to regulation. 
 This article argues that neither conventional wisdom is accurate.  Rather, it contends 
that they are products of two, compounding analytical shortcomings: one methodological, one 
empirical.  The methodological shortcoming takes the form of an implicit selection bias.  
WTO complaints overwhelmingly attract media, political and academic attention. They are, 
however, rare and extreme examples. Generalising from them to the regulatory relationship in 
general, therefore, is unsound.  If one considers the full range of regulatory measures that 
impede transatlantic trade but that have not become WTO complaints, the relationship 
appears to be characterised by tolerance rather than conflict.   
                                                 
1 A very rudimentary version of this article was presented to the University of Edinburgh’s Transatlantic 
Seminar (4 March 2005).  An intermediate version was presented to the ‘Domestic Sources of Transatlantic 
Regulation’ Workshop, Freie Universität, Berlin (27-28 June 2008).  I am grateful to the participants in both 
workshops and to two anonymous referees for their comments.  I would also like to thank all of those who took 
time out of their busy schedules to discuss these issues with me.  I am grateful to Poppy Winanti for research 
assistance in developing the database of transatlantic disputes and to Glasgow’s Department of Politics for 
funding her assistance. 
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The empirical shortcoming has to do with neither the beef hormones nor the GMO 
dispute demonstrating what it is purported to.  The tendency is to depict these WTO 
complaints as reflecting fundamental differences in the two parties’ approaches to regulation, 
with the US advocating ‘sound science’ and the EU advocating the ‘precautionary principle.’  
While the US and EU are to an extent responsible for fostering the perception of competing 
principles, detailed analyses of the prime exhibits invoked to support this conventional 
wisdom reveal sharply different approaches to risk management within the EU and EU policy 
outcomes that reflect messy political processes.  The EU’s regulations, therefore, are more 
political than principled.  Moreover, contrary to how the WTO complaints are normally 
depicted, how the US pursued those complaints actually supports the characterisation of the 
transatlantic relationship as tolerant. 
In developing this argument, this article draws together research conducted for three 
previous research projects.  One on the early days of the transatlantic dispute over genetically 
modified crops conducted when I was a BP Transatlantic Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. One for the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations on the state of the 
transatlantic relationship ten years after the signing of New Transatlantic Agenda.2 One on 
the EU’s use of WTO dispute settlement, which was funded by the British Academy.3  In all 
the article draws on 28 not-for-attribution interviews with trade officials, regulators and 
business groups on both sides of the Atlantic.  Regulators and trade officials were asked abo
their perceptions of sources of regulatory differences.  Trade officials were also asked about 
what influences their decisions to initiate WTO complaints.  Business group representatives 
were asked about their views of the origins of trade barriers, whether and how they sough
address them and what they perceive to influence trade officials’ decisions about how to 
ut 
t to 
                                                 
2 ‘Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States’ (Contract 
SI2.391098) 
3 Grant SG-35702. 
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pursue trade barriers.  These different perspectives were triangulated with each other and 
documentary sources. 
 The article begins by setting out the significance of trade barriers stemming from 
public health and environmental regulations in the transatlantic relationship and the particular 
challenges of resolving them.  It then describes the established conventional wisdoms about 
the transatlantic relationship.  It then exposes in turn the methodological and empirical 
shortcomings that underpin those conventional wisdoms.  It concludes by drawing out the 
implications of the analysis and reassessing the transatlantic regulatory relationship. 
 
The distinctive politics of regulatory trade barriers 
Excluding the European Union itself the transatlantic economic relationship is the largest, 
broadest and most intensive international economic relationship in the world.  As tariffs have 
been reduced through successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, regulatory 
differences have become increasingly significant obstacles to transatlantic trade in goods 
(Commission 2008c: 9; USTR 2008: 213).  Because regulations are statutory requirements 
governing products’ characteristics or how they are produced, products that do not meet those 
requirements cannot be sold where the regulations apply.  If regulations governing the same 
product are different in two markets, a product that complies with the rules of its home market 
may well be excluded from the other market; thus the regulatory difference impedes trade.  
Although there are a wide variety of regulatory barriers that affect transatlantic trade in goods, 
most of the most problematic concern public-health and environmental rules (Ahearn et al 
2008: 34; Atlantic Council 2002; Brittan 2000; Pollack 2003b: 596).4 
Trade barriers stemming from public-health and environmental rules are particularly 
difficult to resolve because they are politically distinctive.  As with other regulatory trade 
                                                 
4 Author’s interview with a US trade official (6 January 2005). 
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barriers, the adverse trade consequences of public-health and environmental rules are usually 
unintended side-effects of policies intended to realise other, domestic policy objectives.  
Because public-health and environmental rules are seen as having direct relevance for all 
citizens of a polity, however, they are widely regarded as being more politically salient than 
other types of regulation or traditional trade measures (Ahearn et al 2008: 34; Damro and 
Sbragia 2003; Kahler 1995: 56; Pollack 2003a: 71; Scharpf 1999).   
Consequently, the political calculus of liberalising trade by removing such barriers is 
distinctive (Evans 2003; Young 2007b).  Traditional trade liberalisation through removing 
tariffs entails concentrated costs for protected firms and their workers and diffuse benefits for 
consumers. Where public-health and environmental regulations impede trade, however, 
liberalisation also entails diffuse costs for citizens in the form of potentially reduced safety or 
environmental protection thereby undermining political support for liberalisation.5  The 
difficulty of resolving such disputes is evident in the very few transatlantic public-health and 
environmental regulatory disputes resolved through negotiations despite over a decade of 
effort within the framework of the New Transatlantic Agenda (see Commission 2005a, 
2005b).   
 
Conventional wisdom or conventional folly? 
Two reinforcing conventional wisdoms have emerged that characterise the transatlantic 
regulatory relationship:  
1. That the US is hostile to regulation while the EU favours stringent (precautionary) 
public health and environmental regulation; and 
2. That the relationship, in part as a consequence, is highly conflictual. 
I shall develop each of these conventional wisdoms in turn before turning to their flaws. 
                                                 
5 Although trade liberalisation within the EU has been achieved by agreeing stringent common rules (‘positive 
integration’) (for a survey of the literature see Young 2007a: 383-5), the common expectation in the international 
setting is that regulatory barriers will simply be removed (‘negative integration’). 
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CW1: The ‘precautionary principle’ versus ‘sound science’ 
There is wide-spread acceptance that regulatory differences between the EU and US reflect 
fundamental differences in how the two polities approach risk.  The Economist (1 March 
2008: 69) noted, ‘Anybody who dabbles in transatlantic affairs has come across one giant 
stereotype: Americans admire risk takers, whereas Europeans (at least in the rich, stable parts 
of the continent) are instinctively risk-averse, expecting the state to shield them form all sorts 
of dangers….’  The Atlantic Council (2002: 2) identified the ‘myth’ that ‘Europe is inherently 
more prone to precaution in adopting new technologies, while the United States is less likely 
to respond to innovation with restrictions.’  David Levy and Peter Newell (2000: 10) and 
Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers (2002: 318) have also identified the ‘conventional 
wisdom’ that transatlantic regulatory differences are due to fundamental cultural differences 
concerning risk and regulation. 
 This fundamental difference in risk aversion has been cited to explain transatlantic 
regulatory differences in newspapers (see, for example, The Economist, 22 September 2007; 
Financial Times, 22 July 2003: 16; The Wall Street Journal, 23 April 2002) and opinion-
shaping magazines, such as Foreign Policy (Tama 2004) and The National Interest (Kogan 
2004).  It has also been invoked by US business interests keen to challenge EU regulations 
(see, for example, NAM 2004; NFTC 2003) and environmental groups seeking to defend 
them (see, for example, Amicus Coalition 2004; Greenpeace 2003, 2006).  This conventional 
wisdom is also echoed by European Commission officials.  In 1999 then Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy was quoted as saying, ‘In the US they believe that if no risks have been proven 
about a product, it should be allowed.  In the EU we believe something should not be 
authorized if there is a chance of risk’ (cited in Charnowitz 2000: 185, fn 180).  Other 
Commission officials have echoed similar views in academic texts (see, for example, Abbott 
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2003: 564-5; Christoforou 2004).  In interviews a few US government officials also pointed to 
such fundamental differences contributing to transatlantic regulatory disputes.6  The view that 
transatlantic regulatory disputes are rooted in fundamentally different approaches to risk is 
also found in some academic work (see, for example, Devereaux et al 2006: 81; Laïdi 2008: 
3; Newell 2003: 61-2; Tehrani 2008: 137). 
 Central to this conventional wisdom is the tension between the ‘precautionary 
principle,’ which is enshrined in EU law7 and actively promoted by the EU (European 
Council 2000) and ‘sound science,’ arguably defended by the US.  While ‘sound science’ is 
supposed to be more objective and based closely on scientific risk assessment, the 
‘precautionary principle’ suggests action even ‘where scientific information is insufficient, 
inconclusive, or uncertain and where there are indications that the possible effects on the 
environment, or human, animal or plant health may be potentially dangerous and inconsistent 
with the chosen level of protection’ (Commission 2000: 7).  The precautionary principle, thus, 
suggests an easing of the burden of proof on those seeking to restrict new products or 
technologies (Woolcock 2002: 9).  As caricatured in the conventional wisdom above, this 
difference boils down to the EU rejecting all risks and the US being unconcerned about them.  
The implication of this conventional wisdom is that regulatory differences between the US 
and EU are fundamental, and thus enduring and universal. 
 
CW2 The prevalence of trade wars 
As a former senior European Commission trade official (Abbott 2003: 563) noted, there is a 
‘general perception’ of ‘one [transatlantic] trade war after another.’  WTO complaints figure 
prominently in academic texts on the transatlantic economic relationship (see, for example, 
Cowles 1997; Kahler 1995; McGuire and Smith 2008, Ch. 3; Peterson 2004; Petersmann and 
                                                 
6 Author’s interviews with US government officials (11 and 12 January 2005). 
7 The 1992 (Maastricht) Treaty on the European Union incorporated the precautionary principle as one of the 
principles to be taken into account in EU environmental policy (Art. 174(2)). 
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Pollack 2003 (eds); Pollack and Shaffer 2006; Steffenson 2005, Ch. 7; Vogel 1997; Woolcock 
1991).  To be fair most of these authors acknowledge that trade disputes should be expected 
in an economic relationship as large and complex as the one between the EU and the US.  
Moreover, regulatory disputes are not the only WTO complaints that attract scholarly 
attention, with those over the EU’s banana trade regime, US steel safeguards, and the US’s 
Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) tax break featuring particularly prominently (see, for 
example, McGuire and Smith 2008; Peterson 2004; Steffenson 2005).  In addition, many 
authors also spend considerable time discussing the myriad efforts at regulatory cooperation 
since the launch of the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995 (Andrews et al 2005 (eds); 
Bermann et al 2000 (eds); Cowles 1997; Peterson 2004; Peterson and Young 2007; Pollack 
2005; Steffenson 2005).  
Nonetheless, with respect to regulatory differences the EU and US have been depicted 
as ‘trading blows’ (Woolcock 1991), being ‘über-competitors’ (Carlame 2007: 303), engaging 
in regulatory ‘competition’ (Kupchan 2003: 212-13), ‘conflict’ (Cowles 1997: 8) and ‘rivalry’ 
(Ahern et al 2008: 35), and experiencing ‘system friction’ (Pollack 2003b: 595).  The Atlantic 
Council (2002: 8), therefore, identified as its second ‘myth’ about the transatlantic regulatory 
relationship that trade disputes pit the ‘pro-environment’ EU against the ‘anti-environment’ 
US; a view articulated by the Amicus Coalition (2004), Carlarne (2007) and Greenpeace 
(2003, 2006).   
 
Mutually reinforcing conventional wisdoms 
These two conventional wisdoms are mutually reinforcing in two ways.  First, regulatory 
WTO complaints – those concerning the EU’s ban on hormone-treated meat and the EU’s 
procedures for approving GMOs -- figure prominently in accounts depicting the EU as risk 
averse and the US as hostile to regulation (Atlantic Council 2002; and see, for example, 
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Ahearn 2007; Carlarne 2007; NFTC 2003; NAM 2004; Thompson 2003). The Bush 
administration’s hostility to addressing climate change and resistance to the EU’s efforts to 
promote adoption of the ‘precautionary principle’ in international agreements also played a 
role (Atlantic Council 2002).8   
Second, the perception that that regulatory differences are persistent and universal is 
seen by some as encouraging the US to be more aggressive in challenging EU measures that 
may not have great economic significance before the WTO in order to discourage it from 
adopting more precautionary regulations (Ten Eyck et al 2004: 266; Murphy and Levidow 
2006: 7).  Thus transatlantic regulatory WTO complaints serve as evidence supporting the 
conventional wisdom that that the US and EU have fundamentally different approaches to 
public health and environmental regulations and that their differences are so fundamental 
arguably encourages WTO complaints. 
 
Two conventional follies 
Because WTO complaints are central to both conventional wisdoms, both are rooted in the 
same methodological and empirical problems.  The methodological problem is one of 
selection bias, considering only those disputes that achieve the prominence of WTO 
complaints.  To an extent this is a manifestation of the ‘availability heuristic,’ a psychological 
phenomenon in which people tend to evaluate the frequency or the probability of events by 
the ease with which relevant instances come to mind (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; 1974). 
This means that more easily recalled events tend to be thought to be more common or likely 
than less easily recalled ones, even if this is not the case.   
                                                 
8 The US government’s position is not complete hostility to the idea of precaution, rather it argues that existing 
international rules, including those of the WTO, adequately acknowledge the right of governments to exercise 
precaution and that the balance between scientific uncertainty and the potential for benefit or harm being 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis (Atlantic Council 2002: 5). The leaders of the EU (European Council 2000, 
point 4) also think that WTO rules allow sufficient scope for members to exercise precaution. 
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CW1 -- that the precautionary approach that the EU supposedly adopted in measures 
challenged in the high-profile WTO complaints and the US’s apparent antipathy to it holds for 
all regulatory decisions -- is informed by the ‘availability heuristic.’  CW1  goes beyond a 
focus on the probability of events to generalise from the readily available examples (WTO 
complaints) to the many, lower profile regulatory differences (Wiener 2004: 75).  In the vast 
majority of cases the act of generalisation is implicit.9  CW2 about the conflictual nature of 
the transatlantic regulatory relationship is a more straight-forward manifestation of the 
‘availability heuristic,’ in which the overwhelming focus on the WTO complaints that there 
have been rather than considering those issues that have not become WTO complaints, creates 
the impression of extensive conflict. Generalisations based on this type of selection bias, 
however, are methodologically unsound (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 129; Moses and 
Knutsen 2007: 114). 
The beef-hormone and GMO disputes are highly atypical as they represent the only 
two transatlantic public health and environmental regulatory disputes to have been pursued 
through adjudication before the WTO.10  In contrast, examination of the Commission’s and 
USTR’s annual reports on the other’s trade barriers reveals a great many environmental and 
public health rules that have provoked concern, but that have not escalated, despite being 
longstanding sources of irritation (see Table 1). 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
                                                 
9 Greg Shaffer and Mark Pollack (2005: 172) are rare in explicitly ‘resist extrapolating’ from their study of 
GMOs to the relative importance of precaution in the EU and US. 
10 Another WTO complaint was the EU’s challenge to a US ban on poultry imports, which was resolved at the 
consultation phase (USTR 2009).  The US filed a WTO complaint in January 2009, in the final days of the Bush 
administration, against the EU’s ban on antimicrobial treatment of poultry. At the time of writing (April 2009) it 
is too soon to tell whether and how it will be pursued, particularly give the subsequent change in the US 
administration.  In any event, this dispute is too recent to have shaped the conventional wisdoms.  Another 
dispute involved a US challenge to EU restrictions on aircraft retrofitted with ‘hushkits’ to comply with noise 
limits, which was addressed through mediation by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and 
resolved as part of an overall agreement on new ICAO standards and policies (Abbot 2003). 
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An even smaller number of measures has been raised by each side in the WTO committees 
that oversee the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreements, which govern the adoption of environmental and public health regulations, 
respectively (see Figure 1).  It is worth noting that other countries, particularly China, have 
expressed many more concerns about EU and US regulations than they have about each 
other’s. For example, 56 EU SPS measures were raised as being of ‘specific concern’ between 
1995 and 2007, but the US was involved in only 17 of those; 24 US SPS measures were 
raised, with the EU involved in only nine (WTO 2008b).11   
Moreover, there are a great many regulatory measures adopted by both sides that have 
not prompted even this level of concern.  Both parties have notified large numbers of 
potentially trade-impeding regulations (and conformity assessment procedures) to the WTO’s 
TBT and SPS Committees.  During 1995-2007 the US notified 530 measures to the WTO’s 
TBT Committee and 1,745 measures to the SPS Committee, while the EU (excluding 
notifications by individual member states) notified 356 TBT measures and 320 SPS measures 
(WTO 2008a and SPS Information Management System).  Moreover, this understates the 
number of potential regulatory barriers as the individual EU member states are also active 
regulators.  Between 1999 and 2007 EU member states notified 61 SPS measures 
(Commission 2008a), and between 1995 and 2007 the 15 states that were members of the EU 
for that whole period notified 1,592 TBT measures (WTO 2008a).   
This reveals that only a tiny proportion of EU and US regulations prompt concern by 
the other party, let alone WTO complaints.  Like an iceberg, therefore, the vast majority of the 
regulatory relationship is below the ‘waterline.’  Unlike an iceberg, where the danger is what 
you do not see, the danger here is assuming that what you do not see is the same as what you 
do. 
                                                 
11 The TBT Committee does not systematically report issues of concern raised prior to 2005. 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The shortcoming of generalising from the most visible cases is compounded by an 
empirical one. The WTO complaints that are normally taken as confirming the conventional 
wisdoms do not demonstrate what they are purported to, either as examples of the EU’s risk 
aversion or the US’s aggression in challenging regulatory barriers.  Strikingly, most of the 
academic literature that analyses these transatlantic disputes in detail does not make these 
mistakes.  The empirical shortcoming, however, appears in pieces that seek to generalise 
about the state of the transatlantic relationship and are the product of focusing on differences 
in regulatory outcomes (in CW1) and on the existence of a WTO complaint (in CW2).  As 
discussed below, analyses of the political processes leading to those regulatory outcomes and 
WTO complaints actually confound the conventional wisdoms. 
The next two sections of the article take each conventional wisdom in turn.  In each 
case it examines both how consideration of the full range of regulatory activity in the EU and 
US paints a different picture of the regulatory relationship than that painted by a focus on only 
WTO complaints and how detailed analysis of the prime exhibits for the conventional 
wisdoms do not actually support their claims. 
 
Countering CW1: Not sound science versus the precautionary principle 
The conventional wisdom suggested by a focus on only the high-profile transatlantic WTO 
disputes implies that the US should not have any public health or environmental regulations 
that impede trade.  Looking beyond the transatlantic disputes, however, yields a different 
picture.  The US too has stringent public-health and environmental rules, as the EU’s litany of 
US rules that impede trade (see Table 1); the ‘specific trade concerns’ regarding US rules 
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raised in the TBT and SPS Committees; and the number of notifications by the US to those 
Committees suggest (see also, Hammit et al 2005; Kahler 1995; Vig and Faure 2004; Vogel 
1997; Weiner 2004; Weiner and Rogers 2002).  This suggests that the transatlantic regulatory 
relationship is not nearly as lop-sided as the conventional wisdom depicts. 
Rather than the US simply being less risk averse than the EU, as CW1 suggests, there 
are three distinct qualifications regarding their respective attitudes towards risk. One concerns 
differences in priorities.  Another concerns change over time.  The third concerns differences 
within each of the polities.  Although these qualifications are often depicted as alternatives, 
they essentially reinforce each other.  The first two qualifications are based primarily on 
assessments of regulations, the outputs of political processes, while the third emphasises that 
regulatory decisions are contested.  It is, therefore, not surprising that the stringency of 
regulations varies across issues or over time. 
The first qualification to the conventional wisdom that the US is less risk-averse than 
the EU is that they actually differ with regard to which risks they prioritise (Wiener 2004: 74; 
Wiener and Rogers 2002: 319).  Hammitt et al (2005: 1223), for instance, found that US 
regulations tend to be more precautionary than the EU’s with respect to pollution and 
medication/medical treatment, while EU rules are more precautionary with regard to 
food/agriculture, human disease/health, toxic substances and ecological risks. The two 
polities’ rules were equally precautionary with respect to consumer protection.  Even within 
these broad categories there are marked differences with respect to which risks are regulated 
stringently.  With regard to food safety, for example, the US rules tend to be more 
precautionary than the EU’s with regard to potential carcinogens and traditional foods, such 
as raw milk cheeses and cured meets (Vogel 2003: 562).12  One Commission regulator 
described the US approach to many aspects of food safety as ‘very precautionary and 
                                                 
12  For an overview of precaution in US food safety see FDA and DoA (2000). 
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distortive’.13  The EU, by contrast, tends to be more precautionary with regard to new food 
technologies, including the use of hormones, genetic modification and irradiation (Vogel 
2003: 562).  Thus the two high-profile WTO complaints that inform CW1 both happen to 
concern issues about which the EU is more precautionary than the US. 
The second qualification to CW1 is that the relative stringency of US and EU 
regulation has changed over time.  US regulations tended to be more precautionary than the 
EU’s into the 1980s, but that the EU has adopted more precautionary rules than the US since 
1990 (Christoforou 2004: 18; Mavroidis 2003; Vig and Faure 2004: 1; Vogel 2003: 561-2 and 
579).  The volume of US notifications to the TBT and SPS Committees, discussed above, 
however, testifies to continued regulatory activism (see also Wiener 2004).  Nonetheless, 
almost all of the US federal measures that the EU has raised as trade barriers – including the 
poultry ban, CAFE payment, Marine Mammal Protection Act, shrimp/turtle, BSE-related 
restrictions, and restrictions on drift-net fishing – were adopted prior to 1990.  Meanwhile, 
most of the EU’s measures about which the US objects -- including the bans on rBST and 
hormone treated beef; GMO approvals; and the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of 
Chemicals (REACH) regulation -- have been adopted since the late 1980s.  
The comparative literature on transatlantic regulation suggests that contingent factors 
shaped differences in regulatory approaches since 1990.  In particular, a number of regulatory 
failures in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s – including the Chernobyl nuclear disaster , the 
Sandoz river fire, BSE, dioxin, and AIDS-tainted blood – contributed to public distrust of 
regulation and gave European policy makers strong incentives to err on the side of caution 
(Ahearn 2007: 26; Christoforou 2004: 31; Vogel 2003: 572-3).14  The variance in the relative 
stringency of US and EU regulations over time and across issues is inconsistent with a deep-
                                                 
13 Author’s interview, 15 March 2005. 
14 Author’s interview with a Commission regulator 16 September 2003. 
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rooted cultural difference with respect to risk aversion (Vogel 2003: 580; Wiener 2004: 91; 
Wiener and Rogers 2002: 339).   
The third qualification to CW1 – that attitudes towards risk vary within the two 
polities – helps to explain variation across issues and over time.  Murphy and Levidow (2006: 
1 and 8) explicitly criticise many of the existing accounts of the transatlantic dispute over 
GMOs for treating the EU and the US as the units of analysis, which, they argue, leads to ‘a 
tendency to stereotype the EU and the US and to imply that a consensus has emerged in each 
one.’  By contrast, studies of regulatory policy-making within each polity emphasise how 
contested regulations are (see below).   
With regard to EU policy-making much of the focus tends to be on the different policy 
preferences of the member states, which are usually assumed to be informed by the 
preferences of the parties in government and the strength of environmental and consumer 
groups and business interests (for a review see Young 2010).  Significantly, Jasanoff (2005; 
2008) has identified significant differences in the preference for precaution within and 
between EU member states.  Because the EU’s treaties permit member states to maintain 
stringent national environmental and public health regulations, subject to certain conditions 
and judicial review, the drive to create the single European market by eliminating regulatory 
barriers to trade from the mid-1980s created a dynamic of ‘trading-up’ through which the 
product regulations of the more risk-averse states have tended to be adopted at the EU level 
(Vogel 1995; Young 2004; Young and Wallace 2000).15  Thus it is not surprising that Eckley 
and Selin (2004: 98) found that the ‘precautionary principle’ has affected debates within and 
international pronouncements by the EU, but has had little impact on policy outcomes. 
Political contestation has also shaped the contours and evolution of environmental and 
public safety regulation in the US, although the political dynamics have been very different.  
                                                 
15 For a review of the literature on how the single European market process tends to lead to more stringent public 
health and environmental regulation, see Young (2007a: 383-5). 
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While interest group competition and institutional changes were crucial to explaining the 
contours of US environmental and public health regulation through the 1980s (Vogel 1989), 
subsequently the relative power of the political parties has been seen as the crucial factor.  In 
particular, the Republican Party, which has become resistant to public-health and 
environmental regulation, used its control of at least one house of Congress (1995-2007) 
and/or the Presidency (2001-09), to impede and in some cases roll-back US regulatory 
legislation (Lazarus cited in Hammitt et al 2005; Vig and Faure 2004: 7; Vogel 2003: 578).  
The Democratic Party, by contrast, is seen as much more favourably disposed towards public 
health and environmental regulation.  In part reflecting different balances of political power at 
the sub-federal level, there are profound differences among the US states in their approaches 
to particularly environmental legislation (see The Economist, 25 January 2007).  State-level 
initiatives and the marked shift in US policy on climate change in the wake of the success of 
the Democratic Party in the 2008 elections (see The Economist, 14 March 2009) lend 
credence to the thesis that US environmental and public health regulation is shaped more by 
politics than by a fundamental attitude towards risk.   
 
Empirical shortcomings: Politics rather than principle 
Although there are exceptions (see, for example, Krenzler and MacGregor 2000: 314-5), the 
vast majority of detailed analyses of the EU decision-making processes leading to the ban on 
hormone-treated beef and the adoption and application of GMO approval procedures do not 
explain the outcomes in terms of fundamental risk-aversion.  Rather, they provide additional 
support for the view that transatlantic regulatory differences reflect political rather than 
principled differences.  CW1’s focus on regulatory outcomes, therefore, tends to exaggerate 
the underlying differences. 
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The beef-hormone dispute was due to the EU banning the use of growth promoting 
hormones permitted in the US because of concerns that their residues could adversely affect 
human health.  The ban had its origins in highly publicised health scares stemming from 
prohibited hormones used in raising livestock.  At the time the EU’s member states had very 
different assessments of the safety of five other hormones used in raising beef; the Italian and 
Luxembourg governments banned all five; the British and Irish governments permitted all 
five, and the Danish, French and German governments permitted the use of some (Agence 
Europe, 29/30 September 1989, p. 9; Vogel, 1997).  These differences impeded the free 
circulation of beef within the EU, which was particularly problematic given the objective of 
eliminating regulatory barriers to trade (creating a single European market) by 1992 (Vogel 
1997).  
The European Commission, the EU’s supranational executive, initially proposed 
banning only the two synthetic hormones but permitting the controlled use of the three natural 
hormones. In the face of stiff opposition from consumer groups, the European Parliament and 
most of the member states, however, the Commission revised its proposal to ban the three 
natural hormones as well (Princen 2002; WTO 1997: para II.29).  Some governments opposed 
the ban, but were outvoted.  Moreover, the Parliament ‘regret[ted]’ that the Commission had 
proposed banning the two synthetic hormones without waiting for scientific committee 
reports, but still welcomed the ban because their safety had not been conclusively proven.16  
The adoption of the beef hormone ban, while perhaps reflecting a precautionary approach on 
the part of the European Parliament and some member states, reveals significant differences 
with regard to precaution within the EU.  It was the EU’s institutional framework – both the 
drive to create the single European market and the EU’s decision rules – which resolved the 
internal political contest in the form of a precautionary regulatory outcome.  
                                                 
16 EC Official Journal, C288/158 11 November 1985, Point E. 
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The adoption, development and application of the EU’s GMO approval procedures 
were also characterized by the need to reconcile different approaches to regulation within the 
Commission and among the member states.  The resulting procedures were also markedly 
different from those in the US, with the US treating GM crops and foods as ‘substantially 
equivalent’ from non-GM varieties and, therefore, not requiring specially regulatory 
procedures and the EU regarding them as inherently different and requiring a distinctive 
approval process (see Pollack and Shaffer 2009, Young 2001).  The EU’s approach is thus 
more precautionary than that adopted by the US. 
This outcome, however, was the product of political competition between those in the 
Commission and among the member states who advocated a pro-biotechnology approach and 
those in the Commission and among the member states that favoured a more precautionary 
approach (Patterson 2000; Pollack and Shaffer 2009).  Although the EU’s approval process 
was slow, it worked at first, but in 1998 the member states stopped considering approvals.  
Although the Commission had the authority to approve GM varieties, it did not do so because 
it was concerned about antagonising the member states and public opinion. 17 In addition, 
during 1997-98 several member states prohibited the sale or cultivation of even EU-approved 
varieties of GM crops.  In 1999 several member states declared that they would not approve 
any new GM crops until more stringent procedures were adopted (Council 1999).  In order to 
get the approval process going again, the Commission initiated a series of reforms, which, 
because they had to placate the most reluctant member states, meant that the EU further 
tightened its regulation of genetically modified crops (Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Young 
2004).  The reforms extended the regulatory framework to include GM animal feed; placed 
greater emphasis on precaution and on environmental risk assessment based on common 
principles; limited approvals to 10 years (which may be extended upon review); eliminated 
                                                 
17 Author’s interviews with a Commission regulator (4 December 2000) and trade official (10 January 2001). 
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the assumption that foods derived from GM crops but no longer containing genetic 
modification are ‘substantively equivalent’ to existing foods; required traceability, 
monitoring, and labeling throughout the production process; and (from April 2007) prohibited 
any residues of non-EU approved GMOs in food or feed.  The reforms also require that 
decisions be based on a scientific risk assessment,18 but broaden the factors that can be 
considered in approving GMOs to include the ‘consumer interest’ and ‘other legitimate 
factors’ (Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 241).   
In 2004 the EU resumed approving GM crop varieties for sale (not cultivation), but 
these approvals have been on the Commission’s initiative as there have not been enough 
member states in favour.  The splits amongst the member states over the approval for sale of 
genetically modified soybean A2704-12 are typical.  On 12 February 2008 in the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health 13 member states’ representatives voted in 
favour of approving the GM soybean, eight voted against, five abstained and one was not 
represented (Commission 2008b).  As with the ban on hormone-treated beef, therefore, the 
EU’s GMO approval process reflects the outcome of political competition among actors 
within the EU with different views of the relative desirability and riskiness of agricultural 
biotechnology.19 
 
The preceding discussion underlines that attitudes towards risk regulation are not 
monolithic within either the US or the EU.  Moreover, the differences between the US’s and 
EU’s approaches to regulation are much less stark than CW1 suggests.  Both the US and the 
EU acknowledge the need for precaution, particularly when regulating new technologies that 
                                                 
18 The Commission had systematically sought scientific risk assessment since at least 1997 when responsibility 
for approvals passed to the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection (Author’s interview with a 
Commission trade official, 10 January 2001). 
19 It is worth noting that this is how many US regulators and interest groups came to see the origins of the EU’s 
GMO rules.  Author’s interviews with US government regulators (9 and 11 January 2001; 13 January 2005) and 
trade officials (11 and 12 January 2005), and representatives of a transatlantic business association (8 January 
2001) and US trade associations (9 and 11 January 2001). 
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might affect human health or the environment (Atlantic Council 2002: 5).20  This is not to say 
that there are no differences in regulation between the EU and the US, there clearly are, and 
not only with respect to the level of risk aversion.21  These differences, however, are not the 
product of profoundly different attitudes towards risk, but reflect the outcomes of different 
political processes.  Transatlantic regulatory differences, therefore, are more of scale than of 
type. 
 
Countering CW2: Tolerance, not trade wars 
The tendency to depict the transatlantic regulatory relationship as highly conflictual (CW2), 
in some respects, reflects a more straightforward example of the ‘availability heuristic’ than 
CW1.  Here the high-profile disputes are not taken to reflect underlying regulatory 
differences, but to characterize the nature of the relationship; the perception of the frequency 
of conflict is distorted by the few high-profile disputes.  Strikingly, WTO complaints 
regarding regulatory barriers are more likely to escalate to formal adjudication than are other 
types of complaint (Busch and Reinhardt 2003: 475; Guzman and Simmons 2002).  This 
finding, however, has to be treated with caution as the analysis is based on only those trade 
disputes that become formal WTO complaints; a significant selection bias, again based on the 
most readily available cases (Busch and Reinhardt, 2002). The vast number of regulatory 
barriers, including many that have been long-standing irritants, that have not become 
transatlantic WTO complaints, suggests that the transatlantic relationship is characterized by 
tolerance, more than by conflict. 
                                                 
20 The US government’s intervention on discussions within the UN’s Codex Alimentarius, which sets 
international food safety standards, on Working Principles for Risk Analysis, ‘endorse[d]’ that ‘precaution has 
been and should remain an essential element of risk analysis in the formulation of national and international 
standards,’ and went on to state, ‘The United States believes that precaution is essential throughout risk analysis, 
including risk assessment, risk management and risk communication’ (FSIS 2000: 3). 
21 The US, for example, tends to make greater use of market incentives, while the EU relies more heavily on 
command and control measures.  US regulations are usually adopted as administrative decisions while in the EU 
they take the form of legislation.  In the US there is greater faith in ex-post monitoring and producer liability, 
while the EU emphasises ex-ante regulation.  Both sides adopt rules with extraterritorial implications, albeit on 
different issues.  See also Wiener (2004); Woolcock (1991). 
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  Although a comprehensive analysis of why only a few regulatory barriers have been 
the subject of transatlantic WTO complaints is beyond the scope of this article, the literature 
on WTO complaints suggests several possible, reinforcing explanations.  Four particularly 
important considerations seem to inform the decision to initiate (or not) a WTO complaint: 
the value of the impeding measure (Allee 2003; Bown 2005a, b; Shaffer 2003; Sherman 
2002); the likelihood of winning the complaint and securing compliance (Allee 2003; Bown 
2005a, 2005b); the potential political repercussions of initiating a complaint (Bown 2005b; 
Guzman and Simmons 2005); and the danger of setting a precedent that constrains one’s own 
regulatory autonomy (Bown 2005a; Busch and Reinhardt 2002; Shaffer 2003).   
Whether it is worth pursing a regulatory measure depends in large part on how much 
trade it prevents.  Strikingly, only a very small proportion of the regulations notified by the 
two polities to the WTO’s TBT and SPS Committees appear to be raised as matters of 
concern by firms, as reflected in the Commission’s and USTR’s annual reports on trade 
barriers.  This may be because the regulations do not present a particular problem for them; 
the regulations may be sufficiently similar to domestic rules or the firm’s own standards so as 
not to hinder trade or they may be accommodated by an easy and relatively inexpensive 
change in design or production. 22 Moreover, according to both industry23 and government24 
sources firms often do not recognise trade barriers as such, or at least do not recognise that 
they are actionable under multilateral trade rules (see also Commission 2007).  Further, firms 
often prefer to try to resolve matters directly with the foreign government in question.25  Such 
considerations are likely to be particularly pronounced in the transatlantic relationship given 
the extremely high degree of interpenetration between the EU and US economies, reflected in 
                                                 
22 Author’s interviews with a British trade association representative (11 September 2003) and a senior 
Commission trade official (18 September 2003). 
23 Author’s interview with a British business association representative (21 May 2003). 
24 Author’s interview with a British trade official (21 May 2003). 
25 Author’s interviews with a British trade official (21 May 2003); a European trade association representative 
(16 September 2003) and a senior Commission trade official (18 September 2003). 
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very high levels of mutual foreign direct investment and, associated, intra-firm trade 
(Hamilton and Quinlan 2005).  Thus it would seem that the vast majority of environmental 
and public health regulations adopted by both the EU and the US cause only minimal trade 
friction. 
 If a regulation does impose significant economic costs, there is the crucial question of 
whether it is permitted under WTO rules.  Subject to procedural requirements, the WTO’s 
rules give governments a considerable degree of regulatory autonomy, including with regard 
to the level of risk they are willing to accept (DeSombre and Barkin, 2002; Esserman and 
Howse, 2003; Hoberg 2001; Marceau and Trachtman 2002; Neumann and Türk 2003; PIU 
2000; Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Young 2005; Young and Holmes 2006).  As a result, it is 
perfectly possible for a regulation to impede trade, but to still be compatible with WTO rules.  
As government officials do not want to lose complaints they bring, they bring them very 
selectively, targeting only the most clear-cut violations of WTO rules (Allee 2003).26  
If trade officials think a complaint is winnable, they also weigh the political 
implications of initiating and winning it.  Because initiating a WTO complaint is seen as an 
aggressive act, the WTO dispute literature notes that states are, ceteris paribus, less likely to 
initiate a complaint against a country with which they have close relations (Bown 2005b; 
Guzman and Simmons 2005).  As noted earlier, public health and environmental regulations 
are particularly politically salient and so challenging them might be especially disruptive to 
good relations.  As a consequence, trade officials may think twice before initiating a WTO 
complaint against a regulatory measure that has strong domestic support.  Trade officials also 
consider whether by successfully challenging a foreign government’s rule they might 
establish a precedent that applies to their own policies (Shaffer 2003; Young forthcoming 
                                                 
26 Author’s interview with a Commission trade official (17 September 2003). 
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a).27 These considerations can affect whether a measure is challenged at all, but also the le
grounds on which it is challenged (Shaffer 2003: 104-5).
gal 
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There are thus a series of layered considerations that may explain why so few public 
health public health and environmental regulations are challenged in the context of the 
transatlantic relationship.  First, they many not impose sufficient costs on the other’s firms to 
make action worthwhile.  Even if they do, the regulations may be consistent with WTO rules 
and so not be actionable.  Even if the costs are significant and the case seems winnable it 
might still not be worth initiating because doing so might damage the wider relationship or 
winning the complaint might have adverse implications for one’s own regulatory activity.  
That CW1 is incorrect is crucial to the likelihood of winning and concern about avoiding 
precedents being relevant in transatlantic WTO complaints.  If the US were as hostile to 
environmental and public health regulation as CW1 suggests, it would have resisted, rather 
than supported, ensuring that governments’ regulatory autonomy was safeguarded in WTO 
rules.  Moreover, it would be unconcerned about setting precedents that constrain its own 
regulatory activity.   
 
Empirical shortcoming: Surgical strikes, not all-out assaults 
Contrary to many depictions (see, for example, Amicus Coalition 2004; Bernauer 2003: 167; 
Greenpeace 2003, 2006 ; Guzman 2004-05: 32; Ramjoué 2007: 420), the US’s WTO 
complaints against the EU’s ban on hormone-treated beef and moratorium on approvals of 
genetically modified crops were not all-out assaults on the precautionary principle, but were 
actually fairly narrow challenges to the EU’s measures.29  Moreover, how the US pursued 
these complaints reflects the considerations discussed above; what is permissible under WTO 
 
27 Author’s interviews with a Commission trade official (17 September 2003); and European trade association 
representatives (16 and 17 September 2003). 
28 Author’s interview with a Commission regulator (16 September 2003). 
29 With respect to beef hormones, author’s interview with a Commission trade official (24 March 2004). 
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rules, seeking to avoid setting awkward precedents and, to a limited extent, by consideration 
of political repercussions. 
In its challenge to the EU’s ban on hormone-treated beef,30 the US accepted that the 
EU had the right under the SPS Agreement to set the level of protection it considered 
appropriate, although it argued that the ban was ‘arbitrary and unjustified,’ because the EU 
permitted the use of other additives that posed similar risks (WTO 1997: 37).31  Another key 
argument was that there was no scientific evidence that the hormones were unsafe when used 
appropriately.  This was relevant to the principle of precaution as the EU justified its action 
on there being reason to doubt that the hormones were safe because evidence of their safety 
was incomplete.  The Commission’s (subsequent) guidance on the precautionary principle, 
however, states that recourse to it ‘presupposes that potentially dangerous effects deriving 
from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and that scientific evaluation 
does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty (Commission 2000: 3).  The 
US also argued that the ban was really motivated by the EU not wanting to increase beef 
production given existing costly surpluses generated by the Common Agricultural Policy.  
The WTO’s Appellate Body ruled that the EU’s bans were incompatible with WTO rules 
because they were not based on a risk assessment, but in this and subsequent judgments it has 
allowed a significant degree of discretion with the management of identified potential risks - 
what level of risk is acceptable and how that level is realized - even when there is uncertainty 
about the scientific evidence of the risk involved (PIU 2000: 94; Skogstad 2001: 494-5). 
 These clarifications of WTO disciplines shaped the substance of the US’s subsequent 
WTO complaint against the EU’s GMO approval procedures (USTR 2004: 1),32 as did 
                                                 
30 For a summary of the arguments, see Roberts (1998: 388-92). 
31 In its response to the EU’s challenge to it not lifting its sanctions in the wake of the EU’s revised rules, the US 
again did not challenge the precautionary principle, but complained that the EU’s bans were still not based on 
adequate risk assessment (USTR 2005). 
32 Author’s interviews with US trade officials (11 and 14 January 2005). 
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concerns about establishing awkward precedents.33 The timing of the complaint was shaped 
by concern about adverse political repercussions, with the complaint being delayed until after 
the conclusion of conventional fighting in the 2003 Iraq War so as not to put off European 
allies (Baucus 2003: 4; Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 179). The complaint did not challenge the 
basis on which the EU approves GM crops nor, despite considerable political pressure, did it 
challenge the EU’s traceability and labeling requirements (see Young forthcoming b). Rather 
it focused on the EU’s ‘moratorium’ on approvals and the refusal of some member 
governments to accept GM crops that have been approved by the EU (USTR 2004, 1).34 It 
argued that the ‘moratorium’ constituted an ‘undue delay’ and than it and the individual 
member state bans had not been based on risk assessments.  Thus the challenge was to the 
EU’s failure to apply its own procedures and to enforce its own rules rather than to the 
substance of or principles underpinning those procedures.  The WTO panel found that the 
moratorium violated WTO rules, but only because it led to undue delays, and that the member 
states’ bans violated WTO rules because they were not based on risk assessments.  Notably, 
neither the EU nor the US appealed the ruling.  The details of the two high profile WTO 
complaints, in addition to being rare exceptions, therefore, suggest a much more constrained 
contestation than is commonly depicted.   
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the two prominent conventional wisdoms about the transatlantic 
regulatory relationship – that it is highly conflictual and that the conflicts are rooted in 
profoundly different approaches to regulation – are ill-founded.  First, they are based on 
implicit selection bias, a manifestation of the ‘availability heuristic,’ and generalise from the 
                                                 
33 One US trade official noted that while one could ‘find fault’ with the EU’s approval procedures, one could 
also find fault with US rules (Author’s interview, 14 January 2005). 
34 Author’s interviews with US trade officials (11 and 14 January 2005) and agricultural officials (11 January 
2005). 
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extreme and rare cases of full-blown WTO complaints about regulatory trade barriers to the 
whole of the transatlantic regulatory relationship.  Looking beyond the regulation of 
hormone-treated beef and the approval of genetically modified crops reveals a more varied, 
and less asymmetrical transatlantic regulatory relationship.  Second, the cases that inform the 
conventional wisdoms do not actually support the claims made. The disputes are not clear-cut 
contests between ‘sound science’ and the ‘precautionary principle.’  The adoptions of the 
EU’s ban on hormone treated beef and its approach to the approval of genetically modified 
crops were the products of political competition among actors with very different approaches 
to the regulation of risk.  The regulatory outcomes therefore reflect the hurly burly of politics 
rather than neat application of a regulatory principle.  Moreover, the US’s WTO complaints 
against the hormone-treated beef ban and the EU’s moratorium on approvals of genetically 
modified crops did not challenge the precautionary principle. 
 Although the EU and the US do adopt different regulations and these differences can 
and do impede trade and create trade tensions, this article argues that these differences are not 
rooted in profoundly different approaches to regulation between the two polities.  Different 
approaches to the regulation of risk exist within each polity and the ensuing political 
competition within each polity produces regulatory outcomes of different stringency across 
issues and over time.  While this distinction may not seem great, it has great consequence.  
Because both polities sometimes regulates stringently each is more tolerant of the other doing 
so.  Rather than being characterised by conflict or cooperation, therefore, the transatlantic 
regulatory relationship is really one of tolerance, in which the vast majority of regulatory 
differences are not resolved; neither amicably nor through litigation. 
More broadly, this article should serve as a cautionary tale about the dangers of 
relying on obvious cases when describing and explaining political phenomena.  WTO 
complaints are both the most visible disputes and the most atypical.  Generalising from them 
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gives both a distorted picture of the transatlantic relationship and suggests misleading 
explanations for regulatory differences.  These misperceptions can then influence policy by 
making accommodation seem harder and confrontation more necessary. 
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Table 1 Transatlantic regulatory barriers 
Type of 
measure EU concerns about the US US concerns about the EU 
Environment Shrimp/Turtle Legislation (EU third party) 
Reformulated gasoline (EU third party) 
Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(challenged under GATT) 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFÉ) (challenged under GATT) 
Ban on harp-seal fur coats 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (drift-net fishing) 
Certification on Fisheries (yellow fin tuna) 
Recreational Marine 
Pre-clearance inspection program 
(Apples and pears) 
Pathogen Free Regions: Restrictions on 
the import of Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetables 
Standards and certification of plants 
established in growing media 
Hardy Nursery Stock 
Restrictions on Spanish Clementines 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCTS* 
Hushkits Regulation (challenged before 
ICAO) 
rBST** 
Ban on Fur From Animals Caught in Leg-
Hold Traps  
Triple Superphosphate Fertilizer standard 
Restrictions on Wood Packaging Material 
Registration, Evaluation, and 
Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) 
Restriction of the Use of certain 
Hazardous Substances (RoHS) 
Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE) 
Battery Directive 
Draft Directive on Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment (EEE) 
Accelerated phase-out of ozone-depleting 
substances and greenhouse gases 
Public health BAN ON IMPORTS OF POULTRY AND POULTRY 
PRODUCTS 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
Barriers 
Pharmaceutical and Herbal Products 
(FDA Approval) 
Pasteurized Milk Products (Grade A)/ 
Import Milk Act  
Refrigeration and labelling of shell eggs 
Restrictions foie grass (state and 
municipal level) 
Pressure Equipment Regulation 
Sanitary measures on live oysters 
Rules on the import of bovine animals 
Mature Meat Products 
Non-cominglement requirements 
EU HORMONE DIRECTIVE 
POULTRY MEAT RESTRICTION: ANTI-
MICROBIAL TREATMENT 
Gas Connector Hoses 
Pressure Equipment Directive (PED) 
Roofing Shingles 
Anchor Bolts 
Aflatoxin Limits 
Draft Directive on Aircraft Certification 
Directive on gelatin for human 
consumption 
EU Directives 2002/46/EC and 
2006/37/EC (vitamins and health food 
products) 
Animal by-products legislation 
Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathies (TSE) Regulations 
Other Section 232 of 1962 Trade Expansion Act 
Cumbersome inspection and approval 
procedures 
National Organic Products 
Non-use of International Standards 
Digital Terrestrial Television 
Fastener Quality Act (FQA) 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act 
Non-recognition of regionalization 
Care Labeling Standard 
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) 
Restriction Affecting US Wine Exports 
Framework Directive Promoting Eco-
Design for Energy Using Products 
 
Notes: Issues in small caps have been the subject of a WTO complaint. 
* There are also public health issues associated with the dispute over GMOs, but the 
main area of difference has to do with cultivation and protecting the environment 
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** rBST does not appear in the USTR’s reports, but it is commonly recognised as one 
of the emblematic transatlantic disputes (Vogel 1997; Wiener and Rogers 2002).  
Although there were consumer health concerns, animal welfare was a more important 
motivation. 
Sources: Commission ‘United States Barriers to Trade and Investment: Reports’ 1997-2008 
(available by searching on 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/cfm/doclib_search.cfm?action=search); USTR 
National Trade Estimate Reports 1996-2007 (available by searching 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Section_Index.html). 
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Figure 1 Transatlantic regulatory ‘icebergs’ 
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